Re: Best practices for signature verifcation

[Steffen Nurpmeso <steffen () sdaoden eu>]

kf503bla () duck com wrote in
 <6F979157-91AD-4C55-8CCD-5CC5AA18BB50.1 () smtp-inbound1 duck com>:
 |> Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)

 |> In light of the recent GnuPG vulnerabilities, I remembered that OpenPGP
 |> is almost never the right choice. CMS/PKCS#7 isn't any better, and
 |> X.509 is also bad except that its extremely wide deployment in TLS
 |> keeps it alive.
 |> 
 |> See https://www.latacora/com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/
 |> 
 |> and https://soatok.blog/2024/11/15/what-to-use-instead-of-pgp/.

 |then what do you suggest to use? i hear it all the time "pgp sucks" \
 |but what's the alternative huh?

I know a gentle and forgiving Russian who said (since "crypto
saves the world" simply quoting all this shamelessly)

  Years ago I started to recommend age
  (https://age-encryption.org/) for file encryption and
  "ssh-keygen -Y" for making ed25519 signatures. But both of them
  do not support post-quantum cryptographic algorithms.  [.]

As well as

 I have not tried it, but read very carefully the format/protocol
 specification of https://saltpack.org/ and it is definitely done
 right and pretty minimalistic.

Especially in favour of MessagePack instead of JSON/CBOR (as also
used by saltpack).

Where this all would end when year++ long working group workoutss
get simply bypassed by working implementations, one can wonder.

--steffen
|
|Der Kragenbaer,                The moon bear,
|der holt sich munter           he cheerfully and one by one
|einen nach dem anderen runter  wa.ks himself off
|(By Robert Gernhardt)