Secure Coding mailing list archives

Harvard vs. von Neumann


From: gem at cigital.com (Gary McGraw)
Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2007 09:00:51 -0400

Hi all,

Though I don't quite understand computer science theory in the same way that Crispin does, I do think it is worth 
pointing out that there are two major kinds of security defects in software: bugs at the implementation level, and 
flaws at the design/spec level.  I think Crispin is driving at that point.

If we assumed perfection at the implementation level (through better languages, say), then we would end up solving 
roughly 50% of the software security problem.

Clearly we need to make some progress at the architecture/design level to attain reasonable levels of software 
security.  I don't hold out much hope for formal approaches to design (though I continue to watch the UK types with 
interest).  Our approach to analysis and design at the architecture level at Cigital is ad hoc and based on experience, 
but it works.  (For more on that, see "Software Security" Chapter 5 which I think you can get a free copy of if you 
poke around here [registration required] 
http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/qna/0,289202,sid92_gci1187360,00.html.)

Perfect languages won't solve the software security problem.

gem

company www.cigital.com
podcast www.cigital.com/silverbullet
blog www.cigital.com/justiceleague
book www.swsec.com


-----Original Message-----
From: sc-l-bounces at securecoding.org [mailto:sc-l-bounces at securecoding.org] On Behalf Of Crispin Cowan
Sent: Monday, June 11, 2007 2:33 AM
To: Blue Boar
Cc: SC-L at securecoding.org
Subject: Re: [SC-L] Harvard vs. von Neumann

IMHO, all this hand wringing is for naught. To get systems that never
fail requires total correctness. Turing tells us that total correctness
is not decidable, so you simply never will get it completely, you will
only get approximations at best.

Having humans write specifications and leaving programming to computers
is similarly a lost cause. At a sufficiently high level, that is asking
the computer to map NP to P, and that isn't going to happen. At a less
abstract level, you are just asking the human to code in a higher level
language. This will help, but will not eliminate the problem that you
just cannot have total correctness.

Programmable Turing machines are great, they do wonderful things, but
total correctness for software simply isn't feasible. People need to
understand that programs are vastly more complex than any other class of
man made artifact ever, , and there fore can never achieve the
reliability of, say, steam engines.

The complexity of software is beginning to approach living organisms.
People at least understand that living things are not totally
predictable or reliable, and s**t will happen, and so you cannot count
on a critter or a plant to do exactly what you want. When computer
complexity clearly exceeds organism complexity, perhaps people will come
to recognize software for what it is; beyond definitive analyzability.

We can never solve this problem. At best we can make it better.

Crispin

--
Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.               http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/
Director of Software Engineering   http://novell.com
        AppArmor Chat: irc.oftc.net/#apparmor

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