Vulnerability Development mailing list archives
stealth executables
From: griffinb () HOTKEY NET AU (Brad Griffin)
Date: Wed, 27 Oct 1999 12:22:38 +1000
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Hi all.
I was reading a mainstream newsletter a couple of days ago which had
the following article. Forgive me if it is common knowledge (it was a
new one for me).
The Danger Of Stealth Executables
"SHS" and other little-known or seemingly-benign file types
(often completely ignored by antivirus apps) can disguise
malicious executables and macro viruses!
A reader from Canada, recently had an eye-
opening experience that's instructive to us all:
I recently came across something that
concerned me VERY much - and could
possibly be used to cause damage or
execute viruses etc. on a user's
machine.
Recently, a friend sent me a harmless
executable file (it was a sound bite),
but it was embedded in an MS Word 97
document. To hear the sound bite was
frustrating, requiring me to load MS
Word and then double-clicking on the
embedded file. So, in MS Word, I
selected the executable that was
embedded in the document, copied it and
pasted it to my desktop.
Not surprisingly, it showed up as an MS
Word "Scrap," file. The file extension
for scrap files is ".shs". For some
reason, Windows hides this file
extension.
So, with a file named "Scrap" on the
desktop, double-clicking it ran the
executable without problem. In fact, I
tried changing the name of the file to
something else, with a different
extension (i.e. ".bmp"). Renaming it
"test.bmp", the icon remained the same
and the new name appeared, once again
with the ".shs" extension hidden. Now it
appeared as a harmless image file -
however, double-clicking it ran the
executable as before.
Call me paranoid, but could I not do the
same thing with a more sinister
executable and rename it as a ".txt"
file? The "scrap" icon looks like a text
file icon - and an unknowing user would
open the 'text' file, but really run the
executable.
When attaching this type of file to an
email message, the extension becomes
visible - but an unsophisticated user
would go ahead and save the attachment
and voila - no more "shs" extension!
Looks fine! Double-click and whammo.
Windows normally hides the SHS
extension (you have to select file/properties to see it)
many users have never even heard of it. Thus, even though
SHS files can contain directly executable content, users
might well click on an SHS file (disguised or not) without a
second thought.
What's more, many commercial antivirus apps do not scan SHS
files by default, and must be manually adjusted to include
"Scraps" in their scans.
And it's not just SHS files. Trojan-horse infectors can
reside in a wide variety of files with little-known, or
seemingly-benign file extensions. For example, if you follow
antivirus activity, you may recall that a few months back
some malicious souls started circulating the Melissa virus
in RTF rather than the more common DOC files. Some
enterprises and users who had religiously updated their
virus definitions to include the Melissa signature got
infected anyway because their antivirus apps, by default,
didn't scan RTF files. (By the way, two new strains of
Melissa were discovered just last week, so it's a safe bet
that the RTF exploit will turn up again, and soon..)
I checked the major antivirus vendor sites and found very
little on SHS and similar vulnerabilities. The
Symantec/Norton site did have some information buried pretty
deep, but a search of the Computer Associates, Trend Micro
and McAfee antivirus sites, for example, turned up exactly
zero hits on "SHS."
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 6.5.1 -- QDPGP 2.60
Comment: http://pgpkeys.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x6FD78581
iQA/AwUBOBXVTQiK90dv14WBEQLwagCg4g5Z6Q4nyZXmBRGn3UR1KiB7O34AoM+0
I0rpWn1N0t3g0gmDBU0bwR8b
=vVLT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Brad Griffin
Infotech undergrad & e-mail addict
CQU Rockhampton, Australia
Useful links:
http://www.pgpi.org/
http://spamcop.net/
http://www.avp.ru/
Current thread:
- Re: FreeBSD listen(), (continued)
- Re: FreeBSD listen() David Schwartz (Oct 28)
- Re: FreeBSD listen() 3APA3A (Oct 29)
- Re: FreeBSD listen() David Schwartz (Oct 30)
- Re: FreeBSD listen() 3APA3A (Oct 31)
- Re: FreeBSD listen() Sebastian (Oct 28)
- Re: FreeBSD listen() 3APA3A (Oct 29)
- Re: FreeBSD listen() Warren Young (Oct 28)
- Re: ICQ 2000 Bernie Cosell (Oct 27)
- Re: ICQ 2000 Ripple (Oct 26)
- Re: ICQ 2000 Sean Burford (Oct 26)
- stealth executables Brad Griffin (Oct 26)
- Re: stealth executables Adolfo Soto (Sep 30)
- [Fwd: ICQ 2000] Blue Boar (Oct 26)
- Re: [Fwd: ICQ 2000] Brad Griffin (Oct 27)
- Re: ICQ 2000 Blue Boar (Oct 30)
- Re: forged packets? Ron DuFresne (Oct 26)
